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The analysis of post-Yugoslav and West Balkan masculinities remains,
perhaps unsurprisingly, tethered to the study of interethnic warfare,
postconflict reconciliation, and radical right-wing politics (Milojevic´ 2012;
Pavlovic´ 1999; Irvine and Lilly 2007; Bracewell 2000; Hayden 2000; Munn
2008).1 Although recent scholarship has explored more fully the position
of men who do not benefit from the so-called patriarchal dividend
(Milicevic´ 2006; Zarkov 2001), West Balkan men are by and large studied
as participants (whether active or passive) in a range of oppressive
sociopolitical structures (Capriqi 2012; Rosic´ 2012). Although the
scholarship analyzing the correlation between violence and West Balkan
masculinity adds a unique and relevant nuance to the study of globalized
violence, scholars too often study and depict traditional Balkan
masculinities as an exclusively conservative bulwark against
modernization writ large without advancing alternative understandings of
West Balkan masculinity.2 For the local intelligentsia and urban media
outlets too, Balkan masculinity represents forces of isolationism and
exclusivist ethno-nationalism, especially in the context of European
integration. If one were to judge by current Bosnian, Croatian, or Serbian
media commentary, the West Balkans are, no less than they were a
hundred years ago, at the crossroads between traditionalization and
modernization, with the patriarchal system actively sabotaging
modernity’s successful evolution in the region. Thus in both Western
scholarship and West Balkan media outlets, masculine identities stand in
for antimodern forces: backwardness, parochialism, and (neo-)
traditionalism.
Even though aggression and violence in many respects certainly do
define West Balkan masculinity, we emphasize the cultural spaces in

which hegemonic masculinity does not reign supreme. Rather than cast
traditional Balkan masculinity as unequivocally antimodern, we frame it
as a masculinity conditioned by the challenges stemming from the
postwar and postsocialist transition processes. After the relative
liberalization of gender norms during the Yugoslav period (1945–1991),
the Yugoslav Wars of Succession (1991–1999) directly and indirectly
catalyzed a retraditionalization of society in general and gender roles in
particular (Listhaug, Ringdal, and Simkus 2011; Buchenau 2011; Kamenov
and Jugovic´ 2011; Ilisin et al. 2013). The postwar period in the newly
independent states of former Yugoslavia generated a generalized
instability attending both new market economies and postwar democratic
transition. Overlaying those dynamics were also the uncertainties tied to
the expansion of the European Union. The combination of these
destabilizing factors has created a space in which national gender norms
have entered a state of flux. The attitude toward masculinity has, in
general, become increasingly ambiguous and multivalent—although
traditional norms have not lost their primacy in public life. Both the music
and film industries simultaneously challenge and affirm normative gender
and sexuality roles, creating a dynamic field of cultural contestation.
Our main goal is thus to make the contemporary paradoxes of West
Balkan masculinity visible and comprehensible, thus extricating the region
and its men from the niche bogeyman function they have played in
transition studies. We maintain that it is necessary to enlarge and add
nuance to the perspectives on West Balkan masculinities because not
doing so confirms the idea that the Balkans are a museum of masculinity
in which ‘‘physical toughness and violence, sexual conquest and the
subordination of women, guns, strong drink and moustaches feature

heavily’’ (Bracewell 2005, 88). Without ignoring the patriarchal logic that
structures, and arguably dominates, much of sociopolitical and cultural life
in the contemporary West Balkans, we understand West Balkan
masculinity as more than a culturally recessive, antirational condition that
makes Western-style modernity impossible. Our analysis gives voice to the
dynamic and progressive currents of domestic cultural production without
neglecting the still prevalent patriarchal norms that define West Balkan
culture.
While it would be irresponsible to deny the sociological data that testify
to the predominance of rigidly traditional masculine roles in the West
Balkans, we maintain that examining these indicators alone flattens the
sociocultural interplay between cultural production and social attitudes.
Our goal is to complicate the uniform and static impressions that emerge
from sociological data by critically analyzing West Balkan music and film.
The examination of local musical and cinematic production serves to
illustrate the fluidity and instability attending the representation of West
Balkan masculinities.
Sociological surveys have been invaluable in measuring the extent to
which intolerance and aggression have defined the everyday in postYugoslav nations. Violent incidents, whether verbal, psychological, or
physical, are committed overwhelmingly by men against women as well
as ethnic and/or sexual minorities. For instance, a 2010 survey of 2,500
Serbian women found that 31.8 percent of them experienced
psychological violence during that one year while 48.7 percent stated they
suffered some sort of abuse during their lifetime (Babovic´ 2010, 52).
Croatian women are equally vulnerable. Data from national criminal
statistics indicate that as many as 11, 247 adult women were victims of

domestic violence in 2011 (Lesur, Stelmaszek, and Golden 2012, 67). The
Bosnian Ministry of Human Rights and Refugees also notes that domestic
violence constitutes one of the biggest challenges in Bosnia (Gender
Action Plan of Bosnia and Herzegovina 2013–2017, 10).
In addition to the widespread misogyny, other, equally toxic, forms of
discrimination define high school life, especially among the male
population. A survey of 630 Serbian high school students conducted in
2011 confirmed that Serbian youth’s view of women as inferior mirrors
their prejudices against ethnic, national, and sexual minorities; 77 percent
of high schoolers surveyed considered family to be a sacred institution and
44 percent would refuse to sit next to a lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgender (LGBT) student in school (Radoman 2011, 24, 42). Croatian
high schoolers are no more tolerant than their Serbian counterparts. In a
2010 survey of approximately a thousand high school students, 46 percent
expressed the view that homosexuality is a disease while approximately
two-thirds think that LGBT persons should be forbidden to declare
themselves publicly (Salaj and Bagic´ 2011, 61). In addition to intolerance,
public violence has kept pace with the high levels of domestic violence
after the end of the Yugoslav Wars of Succession. The 2011 Serbian survey
discussed above also notes that 62 percent of Serbian high schoolers have
witnessed at least one incident of physical violence (Radoman 2011, 48).
In all these surveys, male respondents have been more likely to validate
aggressive behavior.
Our analysis of contemporary Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian music and
film provides an alternative view to the grim reality the surveys above
reveal; we chart the ways in which filmmakers and popular musicians have
begun to challenge the traditional social norms as well as non-normative

gender roles and relationships. Our methodology relies on using the most
popular Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian cinematic and musical cultural
production from 1998 to 2015. By analyzing both popular film and music
as sources, we chart the fate and progression of the masculine subject
since the end of authoritarian regimes of Slobodan Milosevic´ in Serbia
and Franjo Tudman in Croatia. In our analysis, we emphasize the evolution
of alternative masculinities in West Balkan cultural production while
recognizing its limits.
Given that the two art forms have contrasting business models and
target different audiences, it is necessary to examine film and music
together in order to understand views on masculinity from ‘‘on top’’ and
‘‘from below.’’ Since music production depends almost exclusively on its
ability to generate profit, its consumption patterns audibly echo the
popular mood. West Balkan film, however, is largely state-subsidized
through the domestic ministries of culture and is generally intended for
the international film festival circuit. Although domestic films receive
airtime on national broadcasts and are also shown in movie theaters, the
national West Balkan film industries only rarely produce blockbusters that
attract moviegoers in statistically significant numbers, that is, sell more
than a quarter million tickets. We thus analyze music and film in tandem
in order to both gauge national popular sentiments and establish the
agendas of state and intellectual/artistic elites.
It should be noted that our conclusions largely reflect a male
perspective since both film and music industries are dominated by men
who are, by and large, educated, financially secure, and heterosexual.
Although a female cohort of filmmakers has begun to emerge in the past
decade, men continue to account for the vast majority of directors,

writers, and producers. The situation is similar in the music scene; even
though female performers remain the mainstay of the turbo-folk scene,
the production side is still run by men. The cultural production we analyze
is thus limited to representing the sensibilities and priorities of cisgender
males.
Table 1. Popularity of Music Genres in the West Balkans by YouTube Views.
Combined YouTube views of select Combined YouTube views of
urban alternative music from Westselect turbo-folk music from West
Balkans
Balkans

23,659,334

220,103,799

Ratio

1:9.3

Balkan Masculinity and the Politics of Music
To characterize precisely the tensions inherent in contemporary West
Balkan masculine ideals, we examine two of the most popular musical
styles in the region: turbo-folk and urban alternative music. Although the
latter is dominant, the former commands a notable share of popular
attention (Table 1). We selected tracks and videos that, taken together,
total approximately 250 million YouTube views. The examples we chose
are based on the sampling of twenty-three songs, which are
representative of broader trends in West Balkan music between 1998 and
2015.
In addition to being the two most prevalent genres, turbo-folk and
urban alternative music are necessary to analyze jointly since they serve
as cultural divides in popular imagination. Turbo-folk fans self-represent

as affirming their national traditions and/or the Balkan regional identity
more broadly. Fans of urban alternative genres, such as rock, punk, rap,
reggae, and ska, identify much more closely with Western ideals that
emphasize individualism, heterodoxy, and tolerance. In popular
parlance—although not in practice—these two musical genres represent
a kind of East-West civilizational divide for the Balkans (Baker 2008, 742–
43). By contrast, the two music genres are also supposed to represent two
different version of masculinity; in theory, turbo-folk ought to replicate
faithfully the patriarchal and heteronormative standards dominant in the
region, while the urban alternative performers often self-consciously aim
to embody more progressive and pluralistic versions of masculinity. In
practice, however, neither genre lives up to the ideological conventions
that define it. The following two subsections make clear that both musical
categories propagate contradictory tropes of West Balkan masculinities,
tying local masculinities to traditional norms while at the same time
introducing alternative models of masculine behavior.
The Changing Face of Turbo-folk
We begin with turbo-folk, as it has dominated the West Balkan popular
culture scene since the early 1990s. This region-specific cultural genre can
most easily be defined as commercialized folk music that combines dance
and techno beats with folk elements, represented by a female trilling voice
and/or traditional regional instruments, such as an accordion. This broad
definition somewhat obscures the historical and sociological complexity
of this cultural phenomenon. To uncover fully its cultural specificity, we
discuss its genealogy as well as its two distinct stages, each of which has

become a kind of soundtrack for its historical context. Moreover, these
two stages propagate distinct male tropes and exhibit two kinds of gender
politics.
Turbo-folk’s ‘‘prehistory’’ is tied to a specifically Yugoslav 1960s hybrid
musical form called ‘‘newly-composed folk music’’ (novokomponovana
narodna muzika), which borrowed from various folk styles and structures
indigenous to Serbia, Macedonia, and Montenegro, adding to them pop
arrangements and instrumentation, such as synthesizers and electric
guitars (Gordy 1999, 104). As ethnomusicologist Ljerka V. Rassmussen
accurately points out, this style emerged to satisfy the cultural needs of
the ‘‘transitional majority seeking to rid itself of the baggage of rural origin
while psychologically unequipped to accept models of urban culture’’
(Archer 2012, 179).
Turbo-folk proper emerged in the early 1990s in Serbia, overlaying the
folk melos of newly composed folk music with even more pop, techno, and
dance arrangements. The ‘‘turbo’’ moniker appropriately marked the
distance from the Serbian, Montenegrin, and Macedonian folk traditions
that had originally inspired the genre in the 1960s. With increasing
electronic and techno sounds, the ethnic melos had all but evaporated.
Despite its urban roots and unambiguous Western sounds, turbo-folk has
generally been seen as continuing to reflect the tastes of the ‘‘rurban’’
majority. Moreover, although the lyrics and music of this genre have
always tended to be a-nationalist in nature and although it featured
identifiably techno and dance stylistics, turbo-folk has nonetheless often
been appropriated by those espousing hardline ethno-nationalist politics
because of the genre’s mass market appeal (Archer 2012, 188). Cultural
theorist Alexei Monroe argues that turbo-folk played a crucial role in

sustaining Slobodan Milosevic´’s war machine, as it produced a highly
volatile combination of nationalist propaganda, pop culture and
deliberate sensory overload; he calls this mixture ‘‘Balkan hardcore.’’
Monroe (2002) avers that Balkan hardcore was not just high-octane
‘‘party’’ music, but music perfect for paramilitaries in need of both
national(ist) kitsch and high-adrenaline musical forms.
Turbo-folk of the 1990s and early 2000s relied heavily on misogyny,
heterosexism, and patriarchal supremacy to widen its appeal. It featured
the world of the criminal underground, of cheap thrills, and short lives; it
was, above all, about reinforcing alpha militant structures around secret
pacts, honor codes, and a dog-eat-dog mentality; ironically, the majority
of turbo-folk stars were female. As gender scholar Ivana Kronja (2004,
103) put it, turbo-folk ‘‘encouraged the war-orientated, retrograde
patriarchy and the prostitution and commodification of women, while
accepting the iconography of Western mass culture, the values of the
‘American dream,’ ‘body culture,’ culture of leisure and consumption.’’ So
dominant was turbo-folk as a cultural force in Serbia during the 1990s that
to this day Serbian liberal intellectuals and urban middle classes
understand this genre as an expression of evil that turned back the hands
of time, separated Serbia from Europe, and converted the nation into a
pack of feral animals (Cirjakovic´ 2012, 91). For Croat and Bosnian elites,
turbo-folk still figures as a quintessential expression of Serbian popular
culture; thus, turbo-folk’s postwar popularity across the West Balkans
recurrently stirs a full-blown cultural panic in Croatian and Bosnian media.
By 2005, approximately five years after Slobodan Milosevic´ was ousted
from power, turbo-folk entered its second, and current, stage. In the past
ten years, the genre has turned away even more from its 1960s roots, as

it visually became akin to commercial hip-hop and began to aurally
resemble pop music; it is common that songs include the verse-chorus
form and focus on catchy hooks and melodies. Furthermore, because it
lost its specifically Serbian, Montenegrin, and Macedonian melos by
displacing the trilling voice and instruments traditional to the region, the
current incarnation of turbo-folk—which we will henceforth refer to as
pop-folk for the sake of clarity and distinction—shed its unique tie to
Serbia’s wartime cultural context. This is especially clear when observing
the region’s teenagers, who do not have personal memories of the wars;
as they come of age, Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian teenagers alike
overwhelmingly choose pop-folk as the soundtrack of their generation’s
sensibility (Pavicic´ 2014).
Pop-folk’s market appeal spreads across the territories of former
Yugoslavia as pop-folk artists brand themselves as Balkan performers, selfconsciously emphasizing a general Balkan, rather than an ethno-specific,
orientation. As such, their songs tacitly erase the ethnic borders that had
become hardened over the course of the Yugoslav Wars of Succession.
Historian Rory Archer points out that the genre is much more complex in
terms of its political orientation since contemporary Balkan performers
unify the formerly antagonistic states into a shared cultural space by
celebrating the Balkans’ peripheral status vis-a`-vis Europe. He posits that
‘‘the nation-state is not explicitly mentioned, and there is instead a focus
on a Balkan identification—a mental and spatial location that implicitly
includes but also transcends the nation state, potentially generating a
degree of transnational solidarity by implicitly imparting the feeling that
the listener is part of a larger collective’’ (2012, 199). In this process, turbofolk lessens the demands for its audiences to identify exclusively with their

ethnic origins. More broadly, it reorients the region’s politics of belonging,
creating a space in which all listeners can adopt a more multivalent ethnonational identity.
This evolution impacts regional masculinity constructs since it
promotes a shared regional identity rather than a nationally exclusivist
one.3 If during the 1990s, turbofolk was seen as a distinctly Serbian
product (its fans in Croatia and Bosnia proclaimed as traitors to the
patriotic cause) today’s pop-folk has created a space in which a genuine
regional identity can be negotiated and cultivated. For men in the region,
this allows for a broadening of how they understand their ethnic
belonging. While this trend builds on the memories of, and even nostalgia
for, the former Yugoslav experience, there is a careful avoidance of any
specific reference to the failed state. This silence would imply that the
musical producers are motivated more by financial rather than ideological
priorities. Although market forces are driving this musical trend, the
unintentional consequence is the resurrection of the idea of Yugoslav
unity.
The prime examples of this trend are performers Sasa Kovacevic´ and
Dado Polumenta (a Serb and a Montenegrin respectively), who have
established a several million strong fan base across the territory of former
Yugoslavia. Their intention to establish a shared sociocultural region is
obvious in their references to the Balkans as the region’s new unifying
identity marker. For instance, in a massively popular song ‘‘I love the
Balkans,’’ which has had over nineteen million views on YouTube, Dado
Polumenta sings the now legendary lines: The Balkans are tattooed on my
skin/Like my mother dwells in my heart/Nostalgia tugs at me/As do our
people and our music. The Balkans that they publicize and depict in their

music videos is distinctly urban, young, and cosmopolitan while at the
same evoking a deep emotional connection with the (generic) Balkan Volk.
The performers sing of ‘‘our’’ people (nasi ljudi), harking back to the
interethnic harmony of the Yugoslav era, while the video cleverly avoids
identifying with any particular national setting. The clip is filled with
generic nightlife, beach, and road scenes, suggesting that these men could
find a welcoming reception wherever they found themselves. Because
they are nowhere in particular, they belong everywhere.
The lessening emphasis on ethno-national belonging has been
accompanied by a marked, if perhaps passing, change in pop-folk’s gender
politics. The patriarchal and heteronormative content and style of 1990s
turbo-folk has been slowly giving way to alternative visions of Balkan
masculinity. The fetishization of commodity has essentially supplanted the
primacy of exclusivist ethno-nationalism, so that male pop-folk artists
have become poster boys for capitalist indulgence rather than national
pride. The product placement in these videos is ubiquitous; luxury cars,
timepieces, eyewear, clothing, alcoholic beverages, and electronics all
play dominant roles in the performance of masculinity. Brands, rather
than patriotic symbolism, order the visual presentation of postwar Balkan
masculinity. Men’s bodies, too, have become thoroughly commodified.
Male pop-folk performers are meticulously styled, flaunt tanned (if not
always muscular) bodies, and inhabit modern minimalist architectural
spaces. If they are ever shown in nature, they are either on an exotic beach
location or riding a motorcycle on highways and empty country roads. This
generic presentation, echoed ad nauseam in videos of all male pop-folk
stars, marks a strange marriage between hip-hop stylistics and techno
sounds, creating a localized expression of global musical trends. With this

commercially standardized visual logic emerges a curious paradox. On the
one hand, pop-folk’s male performers, like their hip-hop counterparts in
the West, objectify female bodies and define masculine success in terms
of material abundance. On the other hand, the ways in which pop-folk’s
male artists are being currently produced plays a crucial role in
disassociating Balkan masculinity from the national collective, creating a
kind of space in which men can reposition their relationship to the state
and their Volk.
Although performers who celebrate both the Balkans and a modern
consumerist lifestyle have garnered widespread popularity, the West
Balkan public space still embraces performers who are rigidly nationalistic.
During the wartime period musicians who relied on nationalistic and
militaristic narratives, unsurprisingly, appeared in large numbers, but
garnered different levels of attention in their respective nation-states.4 For
example, the Croatian pop-folk and rock scene continues to be dominated
by one singer: Marko Perkovic´ Thompson. He enjoys stadium size
popularity, astronomic YouTube visits, regular TV and radio appearances,
and several multiplatinum albums. Thompson’s entire oeuvre extols the
necessity and inherent goodness of hierarchies: generational, gender, and
ethnic; he presents a stable cosmos of rigid ethno-national and patriarchal
values. In short, Thomson acts as a cultural outlet for those Croats who
feel cheated by the postwar system and yearn for a conservative system
of values. Similar performers are larger in number in Bosnia and Serbia but
enjoy less cultural cache than Thompson.5 Serbian performers who echo
Thompson’s worldview, such as Belleti Srbija, emphasize current-day
issues and are more explicitly racist. The majority of the Serbian fan base
consists of soccer ‘‘enthusiasts;’’ although popular, these songs are not

given the kind of attention and airtime in Serbia as Thompson’s are in
Croatia because of their overt bigotry. Similarly, nationalistic Bosnian
entertainers, although relevant to a particular cross section of the
population, such as the veterans, have played a much more diminished
role in Bosnian culture compared to their heyday in the1990s. 6 All in all,
male pop-folk performers who have steered away from ethnic exclusivism
have garnered more attention than male performers who have remained
faithful to the cultural formulas typical of the 1990s.
Female, rather than male, pop-folk performers are more cardinally
reconfiguring the region’s gender politics. Since 2005, the divas of popfolk have emerged with performances and videos that appear to be more
overtly transgressive in their stylistics. Most recently, one of the
contributors of the popular Balkanist online journal insightfully proposed
that the West Balkan, and particularly Serbian, culture has begun to evince
a penchant for queer performativity. The author argues that outsiders
have by and large remained ‘‘blind to the queer side of Serbian pop culture
in general—even though it’s pretty hard to miss when today’s music
videos, performances and concerts spill over with oiled-up orange muscle
men, fierce divas, flamboyant drag performances and even rainbow flags,
all to a soundtrack of sick synths and thundering club beats’’ (Eurovicious
2014a).7 This sentiment certainly rings true since in the past decade
female pop-folk’s performers in Serbia have embraced edgier and tougher
personas that do not (exclusively) cater to men’s voyeuristic gaze. Taking
the issue of female emancipation even further, media scholar Dijana
Jelaca contends that turbo-folk and pop-folk owe their lasting appeal to
the fact that they promise upward mobility to its female audience,

‘‘repositioning them away from precarity and a lack of social power’’
(2015, 39).
It is easy to see Jelaca’s argument in the videos of the most notable
pop-folk stars since they present male bodies as objects, evaluating male
companionship exclusively in terms of sexual services they render. The
most literal iteration of this trend is Goga Sekulic´’s song ‘‘Ken Doll.’’ Goga
essentially reduces the need for a male relationship to satisfying her
corporeal needs. The stylistics of the video reinforce men’s limited role as
all the models wear only underwear and appear throughout as plastic
mannequins/dummies; one is even presented in transparent oversized
packaging, awaiting Goga’s pleasure. Mia Borisavljevic´’s video ‘‘Gruva
Gruva’’ also unmistakably objectifies the male body, dressing up nubile,
hardened, and bronzed bodies of young models in stereotypical
nationalistic symbolism of the skimpy variety: tight underwear featuring
the Serbian flag, a (faux) heavy moustache, and traditional Serbian
footwear. The clip in many ways mimics the dynamics of a drag show; the
pop-folk diva is a bigger-than-life personality displaying exaggerated
feminine features while her adoring coterie consists of interchangeable
lithe go-go boys. In this way, both Mia and Goga explicitly turn the
patriarchal typology on its head and popularize this sleight of hand among
mainstream audiences. Men emerge as deocrative and convenient but,
above all, temporary and replaceable elements in a woman’s life.
Another, perhaps darker and more violent, dimension of this pop-folk
phenomenon are those divas who more or less forcefully disavow or
threaten men. By 2010 in particular, it has not been uncommon for popfolk divas to fully embrace a sadomasochistic theme and style. For
instance, Dijana Jankovic´’s song ‘‘Easy Man’’ presents a woman scorned,

berating her lover’s inability to resist cheap thrills. As she reflects on her
contempt, the video features several latex-clad dominatrices who
collectively administer punishment on a blindfolded man handcuffed to a
bed. Rarely turning toward the camera to satisfy the male gaze, the
dominatrices and their quest for justice appear to be the focus of the
video. In a similar approach, the megadiva of the Serbian pop-folk scene,
Jelena Karleusa, features a distinctively combative tune entitled ‘‘WomanHater.’’ In it, she tells a story of a woman whose life was ruined by a chance
encounter with the wrong guy. Following this encounter, the heroine has
a new life philosophy that seems decidedly sadistic: I’ll be your
punishment, so go ahead/I will enjoy destroying your life better than I like
orgasaming/After me you’ll become a woman-hater/ I’ll tear out your
heart without you even feeling it. A decidedly more menacing twist on the
classic Gloria Gaynor ‘‘I Will Survive’’ anthem, Karleusa encourages
women to exercise the kind of arbitrary violence Balkan societies usually
reserve for men.
Although culturally significant, the videos that challenge the normative
gender politics are counterbalanced by performers who continue to play
up the cliched versions of Balkan masculinity. For instance, a Serbian
performer of Bosnian origin, Dara Bubamara, in her 2013 single ‘‘Balkan
Man’’ celebrates ‘‘authentic’’ Balkan masculinity, defining it in terms of
assertiveness, dominance, and aggression. The refrain of the song, which
has attracted 870,000 views on YouTube, emphasizes her supposed
needs: I have no need for flowers/I need a man who plays rough/A typical
Balkan guy who can undress me with the corner of his eye/And makes me
lose my breath when he looks at me. The lead singer of the Serbian band,
Luna, expresses a similar sentiment in affirming a rugged Balkan

masculinity by negatively comparing it to West European gender
standards. The lyrics read: You are rarely affectionate/A typical Balkan
bloke/But I still pick you over any Spanish guy. A comparative pattern
emerges even in videos that place specific Balkan nationalities above
foreign ones. The most recent example of this type is a track by the
Bosnian Elvira Rahic´ and DJ Deny. In the clip, Elvira is courted by men
hailing from countries more prosperous than Bosnia—from Saudi Arabia
to Japan—promising her not only Manolo Blahnik shoes and pearls galore
but also a foreign passport. In other words, these men offer two items that
are in great demand in the ghettoized Balkans: financial security and
international mobility. The video heroine easily dismisses her foreign
suitors with the following refrain: ‘‘Neither the Dane, nor the German
stand a chance/Only my Bosnian loves me.’’ What exactly the Bosnian
suitor offers that the others cannot counter does not become clear, but
the popular song (boasting over three million views) resembles the kind of
patriotic fodder that dominated the 1990s.
Although contemporary pop-folk remains tethered to traditional forms
of Balkan masculinity, the genre has injected the public forum with
emancipatory narratives in two ways. First, the fact that the most popular
pop-folk artists have depicted the Balkans as Europe’s carefree, decadent,
and inclusive playground has clear implications for how Balkan
masculinities operate in the postwar, postsocialist space. Pop-folk music
shows self-conscious signs of separating itself from nationalistic
mythology of the 1990s, which insisted that ethnic exceptionalism define
regional masculine identities. Second, pop-folk divas have challenged the
stereotypical macho tropes of Balkan masculinity by objectifying and
sexualizing the male figure while simultaneously appropriating for

themselves the macho persona. In this sense, pop-folk has shown
potential for evolution and the destabilization of normative gender
politics.
The Many Faces of Urban-alternative Music
Despite its notable emancipatory potential, pop-folk is more muted in its
sociopolitical critique than urban alternative music, which remains, for
most part, in open conflict with traditional identity politics in the West
Balkans. Unlike pop-folk, urban alternative music rejects not only the
consumerist values and the embourgeoisement of the postwar era but
also the widespread corruption and dysfunction of the political apparatus.
If pop-folk performers have in the past decade begun to implicitly
challenge heteronormativity and the region’s divisive ethnic politics,
urban alternative bands tackle sociopolitical issues more openly and
directly. In terms of its gender politics, however, the various indie genres
have contrasting approaches. Rock, punk, ska, and reggae performers
most self-consciously reject heterosexism, openly subverting traditional
gender and sexuality. Hip-hop and rap artists focus much more heavily on
broad sociopolitical issues and rap most consistently about issues related
to male urban youth living in working-class ghettos. There are also
instances in Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian hip-hop where rappers couch
their critique of consumerism and materialism in misogynistic terms,
coding them as feminine and/or homosexual. Overall, however, urban
alternative music remains at the forefront of reconceptualizing masculine
identities in the postwar era by celebrating the complexity of gender

performance—even if the alternative genres are not as popular as their
pop-folk counterparts.
Several popular bands radically and consistently rethink essentialized
masculinity. For example, several prominent Croatian performers, such as
Let 3, Hladno Pivo, The Beat Fleet, and Elemental, systematically subvert
nationalistic, militaristic, and traditional patriarchal symbols by parodying
them in both song and public performance. Let 3’s parodies in particular
create laughable and often grotesque caricatures of traditional gender
roles. Their portrayal of men is both a celebration of divergent ethnical
identities and a strong critique of tribal views of gender. Their shows are
notoriously controversial; they often appear in the nude and simulate
male same-sex orgies on stage. During one of their shows, one of the
extras hung a photo of Croatia’s Prime Minister on his erect penis. An
album cover of theirs features two of the band members dressed as
Catholic bishops with gigantic plaster penises protruding from their
ceremonial garb. The album is (fittingly) entitled Dicking Your Way to God
(Kurcem do vjere). The shock value of their performances is inseparable
from their music and their activities, which span the entire former
Yugoslavia. Their sizable popularity can be gleaned from their fact that
their most successful singles attract anywhere between 250,000 and two
million views.
In a similarly direct, but less scandalous manner, Elemental, a hip-hop
fusion group from Zagreb, uses a strong female feminist voice to overturn
the image of a stereotypical male sexual conqueror by inverting the
traditional power roles. In their song Romantika (Romance), the lead
singer assumes the role of the pursuer while the male protagonists are
saddled with the tired tropes of a passive object of desire. The two million

views on YouTube testify to the fact that the song has become a sort of
ode to an emancipated femininity in the West Balkans. The Beat Fleet, a
hip-hop fusion band, similarly reverses, through mocking, tropes of Balkan
hypermasculinity with their with song ‘‘Mater’’ (Mother), which boasts
910,000 views. The male performers sing as lovers scorned, abandoned by
their paramour and vow vengeance. The hand of justice, however, belongs
to their mothers. They sing: My mother is after you/She knows all the
places you go at night/My mother is after you/She knows where you live,
although you won’t live for much longer. The dark humor of the song
reflects both strong matriarchal traditions of Dalmatia, Croatia’s coastal
region, as well as the infantilized masculinity that often masquerades as
hypermasculine bravado typical of Mediterranean cultures.
While punk, rock, and hip-hop fusion performers focus more directly
on gender issues, West Balkan rappers and ‘‘pure,’’ nonfusion, hip-hop
artists concern themselves with both describing the extent, and analyzing
the source, of masculine violence in the West Balkans. The biggest hip-hop
hits tend to draw a direct link between men’s aggressiveness and statelevel corruption and incompetence. They contextualize the exponential
level of everyday violence as a result of unemployment, poverty, and a
lack of any social safety nets. This, according to many rappers, becomes
an ideal setting in which men have little choice but to become criminals.
West Balkan rappers see material destitution as a direct cause of young
men turning to criminal activity in order to survive or simply vent their
anger over their helpless socioeconomic position. Similarly, lyrics of hiphop performers accentuate that the inability of state institutions to offer
meaningful alternatives makes young men particularly vulnerable to

criminal influences, which ironically provide the youth with a sense of
direction.
The Croatian band Djecaci unflinchingly reflects on violence as a literal
dead end. Their biggest hit ‘‘Lovrinac’’ references the main cemetery in
Split, which stands as the ultimate and inevitable destination for criminals
of various kinds: ‘‘rapists, thieves, Mafiosi, druggys, and pedophiles.’’ The
video, which attracted four million views to date, features the panoply of
would-be victims—male and female, strong and infirm, and young and
old—as proactive defenders or their bodies and property while the
exclusively male victimizers are depicted as bullies whose desire to bring
harm is directly inverse to their ability to accomplish their task. This
emancipatory narrative strips those who wield brute force of any cultural
capital and acts as a cautionary tale for anyone seeking to change their
fate through brute force.
If the band Djecaci condemns pathological aggression, Serbian hip-hop
artist Marcelo aims to explain, as well as denounce, the roots of masculine
violence in Serbia. He raps how a young man Darko easily turned into a
compulsive thug, bent on murdering those who are different from him.
Marcelo describes Darko as a malnourished kid from a poor family who
had been mercilessly bullied by his schoolmates. By the time he turned
seventeen, Darko became a tyrant going by the moniker Pegla, that is,
Flatiron. Marcelo paints a grim portrait of Flatiron’s psychology: He hates
Croats ‘cause he heard he had to in his favorite band’s song/He hates
faggots because his church told him to. As Marcelo makes clear, Darko
feels he must keep up with mainstream values so he avoids being an
outsider. Darko’s point of no return comes when he assaults and murders
a passerby because he suspects him of being gay, only to realize that the

stranger had been the only person to have defended him against bullies
when he was younger. Despite the fact that Marcelo frames Flatiron’s
choices around the broader social context, he nonetheless passes a verdict
on him, making him liable for his own choices: How come you are now all
alone and mute?/How come no one’s by your side?/Only bits of someone
else’s flesh stain your palm, your forehead, and your soul—which is no
longer there. But, ultimately, Marcelo stresses the fact that the broader
society should take responsibility for the Frankensteins they bring to life.
Although the dominant trends in hip-hop and rap have been largely
emancipatory, certain rappers, such as Serbia’s Struka or Croatiaa Stoka,
have built their public and artistic personas on conspicuous consumption
and sexual promiscuity. Like certain US performers, representatives of
West Balkan hip-hop elevate hypermasculinity, misogyny, and
homophobia as desirable traits in men (Armstrong 2001, 2004; Adams and
Fuller 2006; Oware 2011). Struka, for instance, has written a song in two
sequels entitled ‘‘Whores.’’ In these two songs, he denounces and
slanders the female sex drive while loudly proclaiming his own. He begins
the second sequel by saying he has had plenty of respect for ‘‘good girls,’’
but is rapping to disparage the ‘‘whoring’’ type that ostensibly uses him
for money. In lurid and graphic detail, Struka lists the many ways in which
he sexually and physically demeans women who are ‘‘easy’’ and sell
themselves to gain access to his wealth. According to Struka’s credo, men
have the right to regulate women’s sexuality and humiliate those whose
sexuality is not in line with traditional standards. Similarly, Stoka, in his
single ‘‘My girlfriend has a boyfriend,’’ exacts punishment on the men
whom Stoka’s girlfriend chose as lovers, thus establishing uncontested
ownership over his paramour through violence.

Despite clear-cut examples of misogyny and a lack of interest in
examining men’s problems outside the young, urban, and working-class
male youth, hip-hop and rap are nevertheless showing tentative signs of
further evolution. In 2012, Serbian artist by the name of Damjan Losˇ has
come out with his debut single ‘‘Don’t touch the faggots’’ (Ne diraj mi
fegete) as an openly gay man. The song, which has caused a moderate stir
in Serbian society, represents a kind of emancipation manifesto in which
Damjan Losˇ affirms his same-sex gender attraction in strictly positive
tones. Symbolic is the fact that Karleusa, one of Serbia’s most celebrated
pop-folk divas and a vocal defender of LGBT rights, has expressed an
interest in collaborating with the country’s first gay hip-hop performer. In
that sense, it is clear that pop-folk and hip-hop can, and increasingly will,
overlap despite contrasting genre specifications.

Macho Cinema
Since the late 1990s, a notable strand of Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian
film has billed itself as discrediting all kinds of hostile prejudice—and was
recognized as such on the international film circuit. Many Bosnian,
Croatian, and Serbian dramas filmed since 1998 have functioned as
cautionary tales about how violence of any type leads to a moral demise
or death or both. In many ways, postwar Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian
film has become centered on the question of masculine identity and its
relationship to violence. In fact, West Balkan cinema has focused so much
on male criminality since the late 1990s that it deserves the moniker
‘‘macho cinema.’’8 Yet, despite being celebrated internationally for its
clear moral stance and its rejection of any type of aggression, post-1998

Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian cinematography has, in an ironic twist,
valorized, and romanticized the trope of violent masculinity. By utilizing
the archetype of the abusive but justifiably enraged macho vigilante, West
Balkan filmmakers create a paradox: they maintain that it is impossible to
construct a masculine community on the basis of vigilante justice while
simultaneously glamorizing violence as a path to cathartic self-realization.
Put simply, these films and their creators are chauvinistic despite
themselves.
Film critic Jurica Pavicic´ argues that postwar cinema has turned a
corner from depicting an Orientalized Balkan masculinity, calling West
Balkan film created after 2000 the ‘‘cinema of normalization.’’ We,
however, would argue that depictions of men have not yet been
normalized sufficiently to merit this diagnosis. Unlike Pavicic´, we do not
see the heroes of film made after 1998 as taking an active attitude to
problems, engaging themselves in problem solving, or trying to sort out a
better future for themselves (2010, 47). In our view, male characters are
still too often portrayed more as victims of circumstance rather than
proactive agents in control of their own fate. We contend that even as
West Balkan filmmakers attempt selfconsciously to destabilize patriarchy
and heteronormative frameworks, they do not hold violent men directly
accountable. Even when directors ‘‘murder’’ their miscreant protagonists,
their death does not unambiguously suggest a life wasted but a life lived
to the fullest. Culture critic Ivana Kronja’s observation about violence in
Serbian cinema of the 1990s holds true for today’s West Balkan cinematic
narratives: ‘‘They take the overwhelming violence to be the main cause of
psychological frustration for the male hero, which provokes his own
violent reaction and therefore establishes a never-ending cycle of

violence.’’ (2006, 18). West Balkan celluloid protagonists consistently and
predictably ‘‘correct’’ injustice with violence, usually perishing in the
process but also asserting their independence. Masculine violence in this
context emerges as a form of mental and emotional self-defense against
a hostile world.
When filmmakers do not blame society’s internal degeneracy for the
excesses of masculine violence, they often point fingers at the older
generation.9 The directors often cast fathers as being either too corrupt or
too weak to stand up to the immoralities of those in power; fathers teach
their offspring how to either sell out or try to dominate the system by
mistreating others. In other words, fathers stand in for the dishonest
society their sons are expected to endure. Suffering indignities in and out
of the home, the male progeny eventually becomes violent in order to
depose the father figure and establish their independence. The antiheroes
of macho cinema thus come to be driven by a principled resistance; they
struggle against the twin evils of a morally stagnant society and a morally
flawed legacy of their fathers. The directors of macho cinema seem to
want it both ways; they want to discredit violence as a way to solve
problems while validating men who instinctively attack moral corruption
with brawn.
Of the three national cinemas, the Serbian one has the most consistent
track record of demonstrating how mindless violence has corrupted the
entire social fabric. Perhaps the earliest instance of this fascination was a
journalistic expose that quickly turned into a short documentary film See
You in the Obituary (Vidimo se u citulji). This 1994 thirty-five-minute
documentary gave a glimpse into the widespread criminality in
Milosevic´’s Serbia. In front of cameras, hardened mobsters openly reflect

on their underground activities and demonstrate that they understand
that their lives would have a very short shelf life. These kamikaze figures
flaunted norms when the rest of society sheepishly lived out its dull, gray,
monotonous existence. In a nod to the idea of an urban jungle, the men
of the Serbian underground came to be known as ‘‘the samurai of the hot
asphalt’’ (zestoki momci s vruceg asfalta). These urban thugs, rather than
military men in fatigues, were the quintessential heroes of the Serbian
1990s.
The embodiment of this masculine ideal was Aleksandar ‘‘Knele’’
Knezevic´, who was one of Serbia’s most famous gangsters. When he died,
even the Washington Post described his funeral and the mourning that
accompanied his death; the reporter described him as ‘‘nice-looking, wellgroomed gangster, just 21 years old, tall, with rippling muscles and lots of
money.’’ The piece even waxed lyrical about the manner of his death:
‘‘After he was found dead in his hotel room late last month with two
bullets in his head, three in his chest and $3,200 worth of German marks
in his pants, his associates organized a funeral befitting a national hero.’’
Knele, who lived by the motto, ‘‘Better to live one day as a lion than a
lifetime as a mouse,’’ received a hero’s funeral. His ‘‘brothers’’ banned
music in all of Belgrade’s clubs on the Friday following his murder.
Moreover, ‘‘restaurants that had paid protection money to Knezevic´’s
gang placed hundreds of mourning notices in the local papers. More than
twenty women also bought memorial ads, each proclaiming that she was
Knele’s one true love’’ (Harden 1992). Given that Serbian-style
gangsterism had become the country’s calling card, it is no surprise that
filmmakers found inspiration in the men who defined an entire era. By the

beginning of the following century, this trend will have spilled over into
neighboring Bosnia and Croatia.
The film that captured Knele’s pathos and defined the visual trope of
urban criminality was Srdan Dragojevic´’s (1998) film Wounds. Wounds
insightfully dissects the psychosis that takes hold of Pinki and Svaba
(Kraut), two frustrated, embittered, and anxious young men who decide
to take control of their rudderless lives and enter the criminal
underground at the tender age of sixteen. Seeing the powerlessness of
their elders—especially their hapless fathers—the young men fill the
moral vacuum by adopting the laws of the concrete jungle. Wounds is
chock-full of brief maxims to help one understand how mastering the dark
criminal underworld of Belgrade ensured national infamy. One such
dictum speaks volumes about the macho culture of the Balkans: ‘‘Fuck or
be fucked. There is no third way.’’ They, like, Knele, prefer to live boldly
even if it means dying young.
Dragojevic´ made this film with the explicit desire to have the viewer
identify positively with the two antiheroes. He openly frames his narrative
in terms of a justified vendetta: ‘‘This is a story about young criminals
whom we believe have a deep moral right to be violent, even to murder,
despite the political unacceptability of this idea. An insensitive society and
a totalitarian Serbian regime have made thousands of Serbian teenagers
dangerous, senseless killing machines, ironically whose main victims are
themselves.’’ He goes on to justify his characters’—and their peers’—
righteous wrath: ‘‘It is quite all right for them to rob and steal and they
should bust into the houses of those businessmen, politicians and
ministers that have become rich during the war, because they have their
sneakers, their first trips abroad, summer vacations that these kids never

had, nor will ever have’’ (Dragojevic´ 1998). This message resonated with
broad swaths of the Serbian populace: Wounds sold 450,000 tickets,
making it Serbia’s top-selling film of 1998. Even more impressive is the fact
that Wounds managed a similar kind of feat in Croatia, becoming the first,
and most popular, Serbian film shown in Croatia since the end of the
Croatian War of Independence in 1995. The dynamic visuals and
captivating narrative also earned the film a place at the Berlin, Sundance,
and Toronto film festivals.
Beyond its immediate success, the effect of Wounds continues to be
felt in Serbian cinema. After 1998, the trope of disillusioned youth that
turns to violence in order to find some semblance of meaning and purpose
has remained a constant. Even after the 1990s gangster culture had
ceased to dominate Belgrade and its environs, Serbian directors keep
returning to this compelling narrative in films such as Absolute 100
(Apsolutnih Sto), dir. Srdan Golubic´, 2001; 1 on 1 (1 na 1), dir. Mladen
Maticevic´, 2002; Skinning (Sisanje), dir. Stevan Filipovic´, 2010; Tilva Rosˇ,
dir. Nikola Lezaic´, 2010; and The Whirl (Vir), dir. Bojan Vuk Kosovcevic´,
2012. One of the most recent instances of this trend is the acclaimed 2010
film Skinning. Part exploration of the Serbian neo-Nazi movement and part
testimony of youth criminality in post-Milosevic´ Serbia, Skinning explores
how an intellectually gifted, middle-class kid with a penchant for
mathematics becomes not only involved with a racist youth group but also
comes to lead it. There seem to be plenty of reasons for Nevica’s
conversion: the lack of parental care (dead mother and an emotionally
absent father), no meaningful life direction (math seems more of a hobby
than a passion), and no attachment to a set of ideals. His turn toward
Nazism thus appears to be, as it was with Pinki and Svaba, an attempt to

find a sense of clarity and direction in an otherwise aimless existence. His
conversion also automatically gains him an elevated social status, access
to the main players in Serbia’s corrupt political life, and the sense that he
is, in a very real way, running not only his own life, but also leading others.
The director of Skinning, Stevan Filipovic´, clearly aimed to make Nevica
an odious character. We see him murder a defenseless Roma youth by
smashing his skull with a rock; he is shown masterminding a brutal
destruction of a Roma makeshift habitat; he violently breaks the nose of
his mentor by kicking his face with his steel toe boot. All these scenes do
not hold punches and are filmed in gruesome and sickening detail. Even
for an audience accustomed to scenes of violence, the brutality
committed by Nevica is unmediated, personal, and gut-wrenching. And
yet, despite the fact that these crimes unambiguously accentuate how far
Nevica has sunk, at the end of the film Nevica ironically emerges as an
honest, if not likable, character.
Compared to the politicians and law enforcers who control various
hooligan groups for their own cynical purposes, it seems that Nevica is,
above all else, committed to solving societal ills by cleansing the
‘‘undesirable social elements.’’ Although his hate-filled ideals provide him
with an access to status and influence, he remains more dedicated to the
movement’s principles than the rewards themselves. In fact, it is Nevica’s
idealism that the political and law-enforcement authorities find so
threatening. Because of this, they frame him for a murder and warn him
that should he choose to not cooperate, they would lock him up and
immediately find a more accommodating replacement. Nevica thus ends
up being the victim of cynical and manipulative regime which, instead of
helping him find a better way of life, commits him to a life of crime. Here

Filipovic´ unambiguously echoes Dragojevic´’s defense of the two
protagonists in Wounds: ‘‘An insensitive society and a totalitarian Serbian
regime have made thousands of Serbian teenagers dangerous, senseless
killing machines, ironically whose main victims are themselves.’’ The sins
of the fathers are thus visited upon the sons and the sons emerge as at
least idealistic, if not ideal, protagonists. Film critic Marija Grujic´
accurately diagnoses the impression Nevica makes on domestic
audiences: ‘‘The young nationalist extremist (and murderer) is
represented as an understandable element of Serbian society, like
someone who is less evil and more honest than others. The violent
aggressor is shown as someone who is relatable’’ (2012, 84). Ultimately,
Filipovic´ does not hold Nevica fully accountable; he is first a victim of his
lost childhood and then of corrupt politicians; his crimes are not entirely
his own.
Macho cinema, as defined by films such as Wounds and Skinning, has
been less prevalent in Bosnia since the country’s film industry revived
after 2001. Nonetheless, both Serbian and Bosnian film industries have
taken a highly critical stance toward postwar developments. Scholars
Tomasz Rawski and Katarzyna Roman accurately characterize the key
traits of contemporary Bosnian cinema in the following manner: ‘‘The
characters are forced to face the fragile present that is irrevocably devoid
of stable reference points, such as permanent jobs, decent housing
conditions or wages high enough to survive the next month. Living in a
constant danger of loss limits their existence to the fight for economic
survival’’ (2014, 194). Even more key in their estimation is the fact that
postwar Bosnian directors are more interested in stories of survival
strategies than goals, dreams, and aspirations; native filmmakers have

been critical of the regime and society but have largely advanced escapism
as a way to deal with the country’s sociopolitical issues.
Srdan Vuletic´’s (2004) feature film Summer in the Golden Valley (Ljeto
u zlatnoj dolini) epitomizes the survivalist attitude in postwar Bosnian film.
In making a film about a male sixteen-year-old abducting a young girl in
order to pay off his late father’s debt, Vuletic´ had a very clear mission
statement in mind; he commented: ‘‘This movie reflects on the moment
when we, the sons, have to decide whether we will rectify the mistakes of
our fathers or simply tell them to fuck off. I choose the latter.’’ Like Pinki,
Svaba, and Nevica, the protagonist of Vuletic´’s film has been left high and
dry to fend for himself. Not only does Vuletic´ condemn the previous
generation of men for abandoning their offspring, but also blames them
for ruining their lives from the get-go: ‘‘I belong to a generation of sons
who got stuck with obliterated cities, collapsed principles, and the chaos
of a destroyed society; all of this was an inheritance from our fathers. In
short, a generation of sons have become hostages of bad decisions made
in the past by someone else’’ (Vuletic´ 2004).
Vuletic´ dramatizes and embodies the father–son struggle by focusing
on the Sarajevan sixteen-year-old, Fikret Varupa, who, like Svaba, Pinki,
and Nevica, is quite ordinary at the outset of the narrative. This all changes
when Fikret’s father Sabahudin dies. At Sabahudin’s funeral, a stranger by
the name of Hamid insists that Fikret’s father had owed him 48,236
German marks, a small fortune in povertystricken Bosnia. Since debt
carries great shame in Muslim tradition, Fikret is obligated to return the
borrowed sum and restore the family’s honor. Since there are no honest
ways to obtain that kind of money, Fikret is essentially forced to enter the
criminal underground. In a paradoxical twist, the man who facilitates

Fikret’s entry into Sarajevo’s criminal underbelly is the policeman Ramiz.
The ‘‘defender of public order’’ decides to ‘‘help’’ Fikret by involving him
in the kidnapping of a rich businessman’s daughter. Fikret proves himself
to be an apt pupil and in short order becomes a capable lawbreaker. At
the end of the film, however, the director restores Fikret’s internal
decency as he frees the girl from potential harm. He eventually gathers
the necessary money only to find out that Hamid had actually deceived
him; there had never been any debt.
Like in Wounds and Skinning, the paternal figures are void of an internal
moral compass. In this way, Vuletic´ condemns the generation that came
before while simultaneously exculpating his young protagonist. He judges
the fathers harshly and rejects their legacy, demanding that the current
generation of men start from scratch; to follow the fathers means to go
down the road of certain self-destruction. Even Fikret’s completely absent
father casts a long shadow over Fikret’s life. The invented debt played such
a negative role in Fikret’s formative years because Sabahudin apparently
shared very little with his son; the lack of meaningful communication on
Sabahudin’s part had led Fikret to accept Hamid’s word and then led him
to Ramiz. Fikret embraces violence to correct a perceived injustice; at the
same time, he is not held accountable for the violence he commits since
he had been pushed into it by naivete´, ignorance, and immoral elders.
Like their Bosnian counterparts, Croatian filmmakers began turning to
the darker side of national life in the early 2000s, soon after Franjo
Tudman’s death in 1999. Arguably, no movie had a more shocking and
widespread effect on Croatian audiences than Branko Schmidt’s 2009 film
Metastases. The story itself had become a sensation in 2006 when it came
out as a book that told the story of four maladjusted friends from a Zagreb

suburb. The narrative about a group of men in their twenties and thirties,
deeply entrenched in a racists, alcoholic, junkie, and football fan culture
of Zagreb struck a cord in Croatian society as a reflection of its collective
psyche. The group’s dysfunctionality is painfully obvious: Filip is a
recovering drug addict who returns to the old gang after rehab and finds
himself incapable of integrating into ‘‘normal’’ society; Krpa is a
sociopathic veteran who regularly beats his wife inches of her life; Dejo is
a drug addict plagued by his Serbian heritage; and Kizo is a weak-minded
chronic alcoholic. Aside addictions, a shared neighborhood, and sheer
inertia, nothing ties these men together. Advertised and billed as the
Croatian version of Trainspotting, the film aims to cast a light on issues the
entire society wants to brush under the rug.
Through the stories of these four childhood friends, Schmidt elicits
images of an unstoppable moral cancer plaguing modern-day Croatia and
its metropolis. Maturing in the wake of war, the young men reflect the
petty hatreds, violence, prejudices, and ennui hanging over the country
like a disease that spreads with no cure in sight. There is plenty of action
in the film, but none of it productive or positive; the protagonists’
activities only ensure more of the same the following day. The four steal,
deal drugs, beat each other and the women in their lives, all the while
talking about little else than booze and soccer scores.
While Schmidt seems to straightforwardly condemn his protagonists as
misguided at best and irredeemable at worst, they seem genuine and alive
compared with their surroundings. In fact, the film makes it seem as if the
men are reflections of their sterile but intolerant environment. It appears
that these young men are reacting to the postwar gentrified sterility; the
respectable citizens of Zagreb alternate between ignoring the hooligans

and cowering in fear when faced with their senseless rage. As rebels
without a cause or ideology, they cannot be bought and act out their rage
by destroying either their surroundings or themselves. This message
comes through clearly as we watch the group’s chronic alcoholic die from
alcohol poisoning and as the drug addicts frame their own family members
for a drug heist. Thus, Schmidt both asks the audience to reject the
protagonists as demented while at the same time coding them as
authentic compared to their cowardly petite bourgeois surroundings.
In his review of Metastases, Croatian film critic Zeljko Luketic´ observes
that the film missed its goal since the very hooligans whom the movie was
supposed to shame actually gave the film two thumbs up; they felt it was
an authentic reflection of their lives. Luketic´ goes even further to argue
that the film proved so popular because the hooligans depicted in the film
‘‘only do those things that the silent majority fantasizes about in private.
Instead, however, their children do the very things they not dare to do:
beat up women and faggots, hate Serbs, drink beer, fart, fight in the name
of their soccer teams, and destroy public property’’ (Luketic´ 2009). In
other words, Schmidt documents rather than mortifies. A Croatian actor
Kristijan Ugrina, who participated in the making of the film, dismissed the
accusation that the movie represented Zagreb’s soccer fans in a negative
light by noting: ‘‘They can only complain about that fact that we treated
them with kid gloves, you might even say with a dose of romanticism’’
(Levaj 2009). Thus, even the makers of the film wished to soften the edge
of their criticism.
Although culturally dominant, macho cinema has, since 2005, been
accompanied by a parallel trend of films which have focused on ‘‘winning
losers.’’ In the past decade, there has been an increase in comedies and

quietly ironic dramas that focus on men the world bypasses. This newer
tendency, evident particularly in Bosnian and Croatian cinema, has
produced narratives about simpatico underdogs who win the day (and
sometimes the girl).10 Although the comedic genre endows these Woody
Allenesque types with a high degree of likability, they have not yet become
cultural icons to emulate, even ironically. It is yet too early to tell whether
the ‘‘victorious little guy’’ trope will gain traction in the coming years. For
now, macho cinema continues to unite the region in terms of its
preoccupation with, and tacit glorification of, violent masculinity.

Conclusion
Long seen and invoked as an exception to the largely peaceful processes
of post1989 democratization in Eastern Europe, the states of former
Yugoslavia have been studied in isolation from other East European
countries also transitioning from socialism to capitalism and democracy.
Because of the Yugoslav Wars of Succession and their legacy, the historical
and sociopolitical conditions of West Balkan societies were seen as a world
apart—at times literally so. Rather than interpret the Balkans as somehow
uniquely traditional and its masculine constructs as unequivocally
antimodern, we reflect on the evolution of postsocialist masculine
constructs as a historically and sociologically vernacular process that is
profoundly and excitingly paradoxical. This process of localized
globalization produces a kind of hybrid masculinity that is defined by both
patriarchal dynamics and elements resistant to it. The investigation of the
most popular musical and cinematic productions in Bosnia, Croatia, and
Serbia shows that masculine models that circulate widely in the public

forum embody a cultural paradox. On the one hand, these models support
binary gender frameworks. On the other hand, they advance alternative
gender models that undermine the legitimacy of traditional modes of
representing and performing masculinity.
Pop-folk, the seemingly most quintessential expression of exclusivist
and traditional values in the West Balkans, has, ironically, illuminated the
potential of the West Balkans as becoming a depoliticized and inclusive
space (Velickovic´ 2013). Although pop-folk’s appeal still rests firmly on
hypersexualization and commercial homogenization of gendered
identities, its strides toward depoliticization and ethnoneutrality, as well
as toleration of ambiguity in the artists’ gender performance, nonetheless
opens up possibilities for multiple male subjectivities. Urban alternative
music much more directly renounces heteronormative and static gender
models,
especially
whenitcomestoyoung,urban,andworkingclassmasculinity.Atthesametime,urban alternative genres do not have as
firm a grip on the national mind-set as their pop-folk counterparts,
partially because their focus remains on young and urban audiences.
Much like musical production, the cinematic output is at a crossroads;
it both rejects rigid masculine roles but does so in ways that
unintentionally popularizes and reinscribes them into national
consciousness. Although much more self-conscious about promoting a
vision of an inclusive and tolerant society through endorsing cautionary
tales about the pitfalls of a violent masculinity, West Balkan cinema still
lionizes men who resort to violence to fight injustice.
It is still too early to tell whether the traditional modes of masculinity
will allow for a further multiplication of male subjectivities since the
region, like Europe itself, is undergoing economic uncertainties—a

situation that usually facilitates a proliferation of more normative gender
roles. Nonetheless, the presence of non-normative masculine models
indicates that the West Balkans are not a microcosm apart; rather, the
region is a part of a larger transitional process in which patriarchal
masculine modes slowly give way to multiple gendered subjectivities.
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Notes
1. European Union institutions define the ‘‘West Balkans’’ as Albania and the
constituentrepublics of former Yugoslavia, minus Slovenia. For the purposes
of this essay, however, West Balkans will serve as shorthand for referring to
Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia.
2. Michael Kimmel correctly points out that ‘‘men’s violence represents one of
the mostmassive global social problems.’’ Therefore, the study of West
Balkan masculinities has a decidedly important and specific role to play in
delineating the varied aspects of globalized patriarchal violence (Kimmel
2001, 246).
3. This shift is meaningful since many of the former Yugoslav republics—Croatia
in particular—sought to create distinct cultural identity for themselves by
equating turbo-folk with the particularities of Serbian life (Baker 2008).

4. YouTube channel PatriotskePesmeSRB (PatriotSongsSRB, Serbia) contains
4,060 songs,Plbih (Bosnian) has 308, while channel Pjesme iz Domovinskog
rata (Songs from Homeland War, Croatia) contains 19.
5. The most popular songs have nearly one million hits on YouTube, while other
managebetween 50,000 and 100,000.
6. The most celebrated performers are Adnan Zenunovic´, Salem Kapetanovic´,
RizoHamidovic´, Nazif Gljiva, Sateliti, and Raspjevane Meraklije.
7. Eurovicious (2014b) also points out that so many Serbian music videos might
have adistinctly queer aesthetic because the most successful music video
producer—Dejan Milicˇevic´—is an openly gay man.
8. In this grouping, we include films such as Wounds (Rane), dir. Srdan
Dragojevic´ (1998), Absolute 100 (Apsolutnih Sto), dir. Srdan Golubic´ (2001),
1 on 1 (1 na 1), dir. Mladen Maticevic´ (2002), Summer in the Golden Valley
(Ljeto u Zlatnoj Dolini), dir. Srd¯an Vuletic´ (2003), A Wonderful Night in Split
(Ta Divna Splitska Noc´), dir. Arsen Ostojic´ (2004), Metastases (Metastaze)
Branko Schmidt (2009), Skinning (Sˇisˇanje), dir. Stevan Filipovic´ (2010),
Tilva Rosˇ, dir. Nikola Lezaic´, 2010, The Whirl (Vir), dir. Bojan Vuk
Kosovcˇevic´ (2012), Cannibal Vegeterian (Ljudozˇder Vegetarijanac), dir.
Branko Schmidt (2012), Darkness (Tmina), Luka Bursac´ (2014).
9. The films that reflect negatively on the role fathers play in the life of their
progeny andsocial environment more broadly include Sorry for Kung Fu
(Oprosti za Kung Fu), dir. Ognjen Svilicic´ (2004), Armin, dir. Ognjen Svilicic´
(2007), No One’s Son (Niciji Sin), dir. Arsen Ostojic´ (2008), Just Between Us
(Neka Ostane Med¯u Nama), dir. Rajko Grlic´ (2010), A Letter To My Father
(Pismo Caci), dir. Damir Cucic´ (2012), Donkey (Kenjac), dir. Antonio Nuic´
(2009), No One’s Child (Nicije Dete), dir. Vuk Rsumovic´ (2014).

10. Films we include in this category are Love Life of a Gentle Coward (Ljubavni
Zivot Domobrana), dir. Pavo Marinkovic´ (2009), 72 Days (72 Dana), dir.
Danilo Serbedzija 2010, Cowboys (Kauboji), dir. Tomislav Mrsic´ (2013),
Woman With a Broken Nose (Zena Sa Slomljnim Nosem), dir. Srdan Koljevic´
(2010), Guardians of the Night (Cuvari Noci), dir. Namik Kabil (2008), It’s Hard
to Be Nice (Tesko je Biti Fin), dir. Srdan Vuletic´ (2008), Love and Other
Crimes (Ljubav i Drugi Zlocini), dir. Stefan Arsenijevic´ (2007), Monument to
Michael Jackson (Spomenik Majklu Dzeksonu), dir. Darko Longulov (2014).
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